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1 Introduction
The existing literature on fiscal decentralization can be divided into three branches.
The first branch, pioneered by Tiebout [22], emphasizes the benefits of competi-
tion among local jurisdictions. The basic idea is that, under a head tax-regime,
competition for mobile citizens should match bundles of public goods to citi-
zens’ preferences more accurately. Tiebout further argued that in a system with
many jurisdictions, competition among them would ensure an efficient outcome
both in the production of local public goods and in the distribution of total pop-
ulation over communities.1 The Tiebout sorting equilibrium, however, crucially
depends on a number of unrealistic assumptions one of them being the absence
of spillovers among localities. The second branch of the literature on fiscal de-
centralization focuses precisely on the spillovers among jurisdictions resulting
from the mobility of the tax base. The standard analysis assumes immobile
citizens but mobile capital that is taxed by local governments to finance pub-
lic good provision. Mobility of capital across borders raises the marginal cost
of public funds perceived by each jurisdiction since it reduces the available tax
base. As a result, suboptimal levels of tax rates and of local public goods emerge
in a decentralized equilibrium.2 In general, however, this literature abstracts
from any heterogeneity between consumers. Brueckner [6,7] was the first to
attempt to reconcile these two branches of the literature by analyzing a tax-
competition model where consumers are heterogeneous and can move from one
jurisdiction to the other. One of his main conclusions is that the dispersion of
preferences is a critical factor to evaluate the performance of fiscal or political
decentralization.
The third branch of the literature concentrates on the optimal allocation of
powers between the central and local governments. It emphasizes that fiscal
decentralization may be inefficient even though the tax base is immobile and
there is no heterogeneity in preferences within local jurisdictions. This is the
1See Scotchmer [21] for a recent discussion of the Tiebout literature.
2 See Wilson [27] for a recent survey of the tax-competition literature.
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case if citizens can benefit from public goods provided in other jurisdictions or if
there exists economies of scale in the production of public goods. The drawback
with a centralized system, however, is that it produces a uniform policy that
does not reflect local preferences. Hence, when different localities have differ-
ent preferences over public policies, the choice of a centralized system over a
decentralized system depends on the size of the benefits of internalizing exter-
nalities relative to the costs of policy uniformity. This result is usually known
as the Oates’ [17] Decentralization Theorem. The present paper belongs to this
strand of literature since we focus on the relative performance of centralized and
decentralized structures when both consumers and the tax base are immobile
and in presence of cross-boundary externalities stemming from locally provided
public goods. However, in contrast with most previous analysis, we argue that
even though localities have identical tastes and value public spending to the
same extent, centralized decision-making may not be the most efficient system.
This is because, under centralization, sharing the costs of local public spending
gives rise to a distributive conflict, as each region wishes to push the central
government for an expansion of its own public sector level and for a decrease of
that level in the other region so as reduce tax burden. Thus, from a political
economy perspective, the relative performance of centralized and decentralized
systems depends upon the costs of this distributive conflict, which is reflected
in a competition for political influence, relative to the cost of non-cooperative
behavior between localities.
While much of the recent literature in political economy analyzes lobbying
as a common agency game (see Grossman and Helpman [12]), we adopt, in
this study, the public choice school paradigm of modeling the competition for
political influence which was proposed by Tullock [24,25]. This approach is
not micro-founded, and therefore is not suitable to study important theoretical
topics such as the role of asymmetric information in politics. However, the
central focus of our work is the importance of the distributive conflict between
regions and the resulting waste of resources on lobbying that fiscal centralization
may imply. The analysis of the harmful competition for political influence can
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then be conveniently based on the complementing, reduced-form and simple
rent-seeking approach.3 More specifically, we consider a two-stage centralized
policy game that we borrow from Lorz [14,15]. In the first stage, two regions
exert rent-seeking pressure on the central government. In the second stage,
the government selects policy by maximizing a weighted sum of the welfare of
both regions. The respective weight of each region is determined by its lobbying
efforts or rent-seeking expenditures in the first stage of the game. If both regions
have access to the same rent-seeking technology or influence function, the two
regions neutralize each other in the political process and policy (i.e. local public
spending in each region) is therefore optimal as it would be the case in a model
à la Grossman and Helpman4. Centralized decision-making, however, entails
influence costs for the two regions. Under a decentralized system, each region
provides and finances its own level of public spending given the other region’s
choice of public policy. Externalities under this system are, in consequence,
not internalized. Both regimes yield an inefficient outcome and the question
is: which regime results in lower regional surplus, centralized provision with
its influence activities or decentralized provision with its free-riding behavior.
We show that centralization yields a higher level of surplus only if both the
spillover effect from local public spending is sufficiently large and the elasticity
of the influence function is sufficiently small.
In related work, Besley and Coate [5] provide a political economy analysis
of the relative benefits of centralized and decentralized provision of local public
goods. They dispense with the hypothesis that centralized policy is uniform
across localities with different preferences and also assume that it is determined
by a legislature of locally elected representatives.5 The drawback of centraliza-
3For other analysis that use and justify the contest approach for studying competitive
lobbying between several interest groups, see for example Epstein and Nitzan [8,9].
4For example, in Grossman and Helpman [11], the politician as a common agent implements
the optimal trade policy (i.e. free trade for a small open economy), when all interest groups,
as principals, offer campaign contributions to influence policy.
5 In the same spirit, see also Lockwood [13].
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tion is that it produces strategic incentives to elect representatives with different
preferences from the median voters’ preferences. The cost of strategic delegation
is then balanced with the cost of decentralized and non-cooperative behavior to
determine which regime performs better. Lorz and Willmann [16], also consider
that voters strategically elect regional representatives who then decide both the
degree of centralization and the regional cost shares of centrally provided public
goods. In their model, strategic delegation partially undermines the benefits of
internalizing spillovers under centralization, and it also leads to less centraliza-
tion than is optimal. In our analysis, the source of inefficiency of centralized
provision also stems from political economy considerations but the political pro-
cess is totally different since it is assumed to take the form of a lobbying game.
Other recent works, including among others Redoano and Scharf [20], Alesina,
Angeloni and Etro [2,3], analyze alternative voting rules such as direct referen-
dum or qualified majority voting. However, in these studies, the relative benefits
of centralization always depend on the internalization of the externalities while
that on decentralization on the adaptability to regional differences. In this pa-
per, we present an alternative political economy analysis of the drawbacks of
centralization which abstracts from any heterogeneity between localities and
that emphasizes the costs of the competition for political influence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. In Sections 3 and 4, we analyze policy outcomes under decentralized
and centralized decision-making, respectively. Section 5 provides a welfare com-
parison of the two regimes. The last Section concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an economy of two equally sized regions, indexed by j = A,B, with
the region size normalized to 1. There are three goods in the economy, a private
good x and two local public goods gA and gB , each one associated with a
particular region. All individuals have identical endowments y in private goods
and to produce one unit of either of the local public goods, requires 1 unit of
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the private good.6 In addition, all individuals share the same preferences for
public good consumption and individuals in region j have the following utility
function
vj = xj +H [(1− β) gj + βgk] , j 6= k. (1)
The parameter 0 < β < 1/2 captures the spillover effects from other region’s
public spending on the ”home” region.7 The lower β is, the more citizens
care about the public good in their own region. The function H (.) is a twice
differentiable function and also satisfies the following standard conditions:
A1: For all g: (i) Hg(.) > 0 and Hgg(.) < 0. (ii) limg→0Hg(.) = ∞. (iii)
limg→∞Hg(.) = 0. (iv) H(0) = 0.
Given that the income is sufficiently high to always allow positive consumption
of the private good, there are no wealth effects and so we can focus on the
public good surplus. Pareto efficiency requires maximization of the aggregate
surplus: H [(1− β) gA + βgB ] +H [(1− β) gB + βgA]− (gA + gB) with respect
to gA and gB . Because the two regions are the same, the Pareto-optimal level
of local public spending is identical across regions and is given by the following
first-order condition: Hg [g∗] = 1. Let V (.) being the inverse function of the
derivative of the H function i.e. V (.) ≡ H−1g (.). We then have g∗ = V (1).
Since H is concave, V is a decreasing function.
This symmetric Pareto optimal allocation yields an individual (regional)
public good surplus of
S∗ = H [V (1)]− V (1) . (2)
6We will assume throughout that individual endowments are large enough to meet their
tax obligations.
7We eliminate the polar extremes of 0 and 1/2 for reasons that will become clear later on
(see footnote 10).
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Observe that the optimal level of regional surplus is independent of the level of
spillovers.8
3 Decentralization
Under a decentralized regime, public goods are provided and financed at the
regional level. The representatives of each region j simultaneously and indepen-
dently select gj to maximize their own public good surplusH [(1− β) gj + βgk]−
gj . The following first-order condition has to be satisfied (for j = A,B)
(1− β)Hg
£
G0j
¤
= 1 (3)
where G0j = (1− β) g0j + βg0k, j 6= k, is the level of effective public consumption
in region j. Therefore, in the Nash equilibrium between the two regions, we
have the following common equilibrium level of local public good i.e.
g0A = g
0
B = V
µ
1
1− β
¶
(4)
where V (.) ≡ H−1g (.). This amount decreases in β because of the free-riding
incentives and is smaller than the optimal amount V (1). In equilibrium, the
public good surplus in both regions reads as
8 Indeed, with our specification of the utility function, an increase in the spillover parameter
β does not lead to a mechanical increase of surplus. This would not be the case with the
following quasi-linear specification: vj = xj + H [gj + βgk], that is generally used in the
literature. With this specification, given gj for j = A,B, an increase in β always raises
surplus. Hence, in that case, the optimal level of local public good is increasing in the size
of the public good externality. By contrast, the equilibrium level of local public good, under
decentralization, is independent of β while with our specification it is decreasing in β. However,
with both specifications, the welfare difference between the optimal outcome and the outcome
under decentralization is increasing in β. Hence, as it will become clear later in the paper,
the two specifications lead to the same qualitative results.
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S0 = H
∙
V
µ
1
1− β
¶¸
− V
µ
1
1− β
¶
. (5)
The derivative of S0 with respect to β is given by
∂S0
∂β
=
1
(1− β)2
.Hg
∙
V
µ
1
1− β
¶¸
.Vg
µ
1
1− β
¶
− 1
(1− β)2
.Vg
µ
1
1− β
¶
< 0.
(6)
By definition of the V (.) function, we have Hg [V (.)] ≡ I (.) where I (.) is the
identity function. Simplifying the above expression, we then have
∂S0
∂β
=
β
(1− β)3
.Vg
µ
1
1− β
¶
< 0 (7)
since from the conditions on the function H (.), we have Vg (.) < 0. The equilib-
rium level of surplus is, therefore, decreasing in the spillover parameter. Hence,
the difference between the optimal level of surplus and the level of surplus under
decentralization grows larger as the spillover parameter increases.
4 Centralization
Under a centralized regime, the level of public spending gj in the jth region is
decided by a central authority and is funded by a general and uniform lump-sum
tax. Thus, public goods levels (gA, gB) result in a tax of
(gA+gB)
2 on all citi-
zens. This common financing rule may give both regions incentives to organize
themselves in interest groups in order to influence centralized policy-making
through rent-seeking activities. To model political influence of rent-seeking, we
use a simple (two-stage) policy game that we borrow from Lorz [15]. In the first
stage, each region exerts rent-seeking pressure on the central government, taking
the pressure of the other region as given. In the second stage, the government
selects the levels of local public goods by maximizing a weighted sum of the
welfare of both regions. The respective weights φA and φB are determined by
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the level of rent-seeking expenditures of regions A and B in the first stage of
the game.9 Let W be the objective function of the government i.e.
W =
½
φAvA + φBvB; if φA 6= 0 and φB 6= 0,
vA + vB, otherwise.
(8)
Each region j can raise its political weight φj by rent-seeking expenditures Tj ≥
0. Let the weight φj ≡ φ (Tj) , for j = A,B, be a twice differentiable function of
the rent-seeking expenditures Tj spent by the representative individual of group
j, which has the same properties than the H (.) function i.e.
A2: For all Tj ; (i) φ0 (Tj) > 0 and φ00 (Tj) < 0. (ii) limTj→0 φ
0 (Tj) = ∞. (iii)
limTj→∞ φ
0 (Tj) = 0. (iv) φ (0) = 0.
For example, one permissible class of functions is φ (Tj) = (1/γ)T
γ
j where 0 <
γ < 1 is the elasticity of the rent-seeking function. Condition (i) states that
political influence is assumed to be an increasing and concave function of rent-
seeking expenditures. In other words, there are decreasing returns to the scale
of rent-seeking expenditures. From conditions (ii) and (iii) marginal influence
can vary between 0 and infinity. The last condition needs a remark. When
Tj = 0 the influence function is set equal to 0. If the two regions do not engage
in influence activities, the government is assumed to maximize the arithmetic
sum of the welfare functions of both regions.
9This type of objective function can be micro-founded with a probabilistic voting model in
which two candidates compete for votes in a forthcoming elections. It is well-known that in
such models, candidates maximize a weighted social welfare function with the weight of each
group of voters being inversely related to the degree of uncertainty concerning the ideological
bias term of the members of this group (see, for example, Chapter 3 on Electoral Competi-
tion in Persson and Tabellini [18]). Following Lorz [15], rent-seeking can be introduced into
this political setting in a way that groups spend resources to reduce the uncertainty of the
candidates, which in turn increases their weights in the objective function of the government.
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As usual, the outcome of the second stage of the policy game is derived first.
The central government selects gA and gB so as to maximize weighted aggregate
public good surplus i.e.
φA
∙
H [(1− β) gA + βgB]−
gA + gB
2
¸
+ φB
∙
H [(1− β) gB + βgA]−
gA + gB
2
¸
.
(9)
The levels egj and egk chosen by the central government must solve the following
first-order condition (for j = A,B)
(1− β)φjHg
³ eGj´+ βφkHg ³ eGk´ = 12 (φA + φB) , j 6= k, (10)
where eGj = (1− β) egj + βegk, j 6= k is the effective level of public good con-
sumption in each region.10 Solving this system, we find (for j = A,B)
φrjHg
³ eGj´ = 1
2
(11)
where φrj = φj/ (φA + φB) and φ
r
k =
¡
1− φrj
¢
. From this equation and using
the implicit function theorem, we have
10Observe that when β = 1/2, this system of first-order conditions reduce to
Hg
¡
1
2
egA + 12egB¢ = 1. In this case, the levels of local public spending chosen by the cen-
tral authority do not depend on the political weight of any group. Indeed, when β = 1/2 the
two local public goods are perfect substitutes and citizens care equally about public spend-
ing in both regions. Hence, they do not have any incentives to engage in influence activities
and so there is no trade-off between centralization and decentralization (i.e. centralization is
efficient and always dominates decentralization). On the other extreme, when β = 0, citizens
care only about the public good in their own region. Hence, there are no public good exter-
nalities and again no trade-off between the two systems (i.e. decentralization is efficient and
always dominates centralization). This is why we excluded these uninteresting cases from the
analysis.
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∂ eGj
∂φrj
= −
Hg
³ eGj´
φrjHgg
³ eGj´ =
eGj
φrjθ
³ eGj´ > 0, (12)
∂ eGk
∂φrj
=
Hg
³ eGk´¡
1− φrj
¢
Hgg
³ eGk´ = −
eGk¡
1− φrj
¢
θ
³ eGk´ < 0
where θ (.) = −Hgg (g) .g/Hg (g) > 0 is an index of concavity of the utility
function. It can also be interpreted as the elasticity of the marginal valua-
tion for public good consumption (which, from now, is assumed to be con-
stant i.e. θ
³ eGj´ = θ ³ eGk´ = θ). From the above expressions, we then have
(1− β)
£
∂egj/∂φrj¤+ β £∂egk/∂φrj¤ > 0 and (1− β) £∂egk/∂φrj¤+β £∂egj/∂φrj¤ < 0.
Hence, one of the two derivatives of local public spending with respect to φrj
must be positive while the other must be negative. Since β < 1/2, this neces-
sarily implies that
∂egj
∂φrj
> 0 and
∂egk
∂φrj
< 0. (13)
The equilibrium level of local public spending that is provided by the govern-
ment, in each region, is increasing in the political influence of that region and
decreasing in the political influence of the other region. This is because pub-
lic goods have local benefits while the costs of these goods are shared equally
between the two regions. Therefore, the higher the political influence of one
region is, the higher its ability to shift the cost of local public spending onto
the other region and the higher its ability to resist the financing requirement of
local public spending in the other region. As a result, an increase in the political
influence of region j causes, in the second stage of the game, a higher public
sector level in region j and a lower public sector level in region k.
In the first stage of the policy game, each region j can raise its political
weight φj by rent-seeking expenditures. Each region then maximizes its surplus
minus the cost of its lobbying pressure i.e. maximizes H
³ eGj´ − (egA+egB)2 −
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Tj with respect to Tj . Observe first that there is no equilibrium of the rent-
seeking game where the two regions do not try to influence centralized decision-
making. Indeed, if one region does not invest in rent-seeking activities, the other
region could be the unique agent in the objective function of the government by
investing an arbitrarily small amount. Hence, the following first-order condition
has to be satisfied (for j = A,B) with eGj , ∂ eGj/∂φrj and ∂ eGk/∂φrj given by (11)
and (12) respectively
"
Hg
³ eGj´ ∂ eGj∂φrj − 12
Ã
∂ eGA
∂φrj
+
∂ eGB
∂φrj
!#
∂φrj
∂Tj
− 1 = 0 (14)
since egA + egB = eGA + eGB . Note that Hg ³ eGj (.)´ = I (.) where I (.) is the
identity function. Indeed, from equation (11) and recalling that V (.) ≡ H−1g (.),
we have eGj = V £1/ ¡2φrj¢¤. Using also (12), we then have
"
1
2φrj
eGj
φrjθ
− 1
2
Ã eGj
φrjθ
−
eGk¡
1− φrj
¢
θ
!#
∂φrj
∂Tj
= 1 (15)
where again θ is the (constant) elasticity of the marginal valuation for public
good consumption. We finally have
∂φrj
∂Tj
=
2θ.
¡
φrj
¢2
.
¡
1− φrj
¢h¡
1− φrj
¢2
. eGj + ¡φrj¢2 . eGki , j 6= k. (16)
It represents equilibrium rent-seeking expenditures Tj , for j = A,B, that are
best responses to each other. Since φrA + φ
r
B = 1, we can express the marginal
relative political effectiveness of one region relative to the other in the following
way
∂φrA/∂TA
∂φrB/∂TB
=
φrA
φrB
. (17)
Recalling that φrj = φj/[φA+φB] = φ (Tj) /[φ (TA)+φ (TB)], we have ∂φ
r
j/∂Tj =
φ(Tk).φ
0(Tj)
[φ(TA)+φ(TB)]2
for j 6= k. Hence, (17) reduces to
12
φ0 (TA)
φ0 (TB)
=
∙
φ (TA)
φ (TB)
¸2
. (18)
Therefore, since the two regions have access to the same influence function, (18)
is satisfied by the same level eT of lobbying effort of both regions. It follows that
both groups have the same influence on policy making i.e. φA = φB = φ
³eT´
and φrA = φ
r
B = 1/2. The two regions neutralize each other in the political
process and the government provides the same levels of local public goods as
without influence activities. Indeed, using (11), we have eG = eg = V (1).
The political game is thus zero-sum in influence and negative-sum in rent-
seeking expenditures. Because public goods have local specific benefits but are
financed by general taxation, there is an incentive for each region to lobby for
an expansion of its own public sector level. Put another way, both regions have
incentives to engage in rent-seeking activities to extract more of the common
resources in the second stage of the game. The two regions, however, end up in
a prisoner’s dilemma situation and they would rather not lobby if they could.11
We now characterize the equilibrium level of rent-seeking expenditures and
the regional surplus under centralized decision-making. Let note γ the elas-
ticity of the influence function i.e. γ = φ
0(T )T
φ(T ) . Recalling that ∂φ
r
j/∂Tj =
φ(Tk).φ
0(Tj)
[φ(TA)+φ(TB)]2
, we have
∂φrj
∂Tj
¯¯¯
Tj= eT = φ
0( eT)
4φ( eT) = γ4 eT . Hence, because φrj = 1/2
and eGj = eg (for j = A,B) (16) gives the following common level of influence
activities
eT = γeg
2θ
. (19)
The equilibrium level of rent-seeking activities is increasing in the elasticity of
the influence function and decreasing in the elasticity of the marginal valuation
for public good consumption. The surplus in both regions is
11Some authors have analyzed how lobbies, in particular in the trade context, can agree to
stop competing for political rents. For example, Aidt [1] studies cooperative lobbying as a
costly Nash bargaining over the set of Pareto-improving reductions in lobbying activities.
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eS = H [V (1)]− γ + 2θ
2θ
V (1) . (20)
We now turn to the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized
provision of local public goods.
5 Centralized versus Decentralized Provision
The welfare difference between centralized and decentralized provision of local
public spending, given by (20) and (5), respectively is eS − S0 or
∆ (β, γ) = H [V (1)]− [(γ + 2θ) /2θ]V (1)−H [V (1/ (1− β))] + V (1/ (1− β)) .
(21)
This expression is increasing in β and decreasing in γ.12 When β is approaching
0, the above expression is clearly negative. The decentralized system yields an
efficient outcome and dominates the centralized system since it avoids costly
influence activities, whose level is given by (19). When β is approaching 12 ,
the above expression can be positive only if γ, the elasticity of the rent-seeking
function, is sufficiently small. We can then establish the following result.
Proposition 1 Let γ such that lim
β→1/2
∆ (β, γ) = 0. Then, (i) if γ ≥ γ, decen-
tralization dominates centralization independently of the level of spillovers; (ii)
if γ < γ, there exists a threshold value of the spillover parameter, that is in-
creasing in γ, i.e. β (γ) < 12 such that for any value above (below) this threshold,
centralization (decentralization) produces a higher level of surplus.
Proof. Given the elasticity of the influence function γ, the welfare differ-
ence between centralized and decentralized decision-making is increasing in the
spillover parameter β. As a result, given γ, ∆ (β, γ) is negative for β close to
0 and reaches a maximum when β is approaching 1/2. (Again, if β = 1/2, we
12The sign of the derivative of this expression with θ is, however, indeterminate since a
change in θ will also affect the H (.) function.
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have eT = 0 and centralization produces an efficient outcome.) If we define γ
the value such that at this maximum, ∆ (β, γ) is equal to 0, then for any γ ≥ γ,
∆ (β, γ) is negative or null since ∆ (β, γ) is decreasing in γ. In this case, as
stated in part (i) of the above Proposition, decentralization dominates central-
ization independently of the spillover parameter. If, however γ < γ, ∆ (β, γ)
is positive when β is approaching 1/2. Therefore, because ∆ (β, γ) is increas-
ing in β, there exists a limiting value of the spillover parameter (as a function
of γ) i.e. β (γ) < 1/2, such that for any β > (<) β (γ), ∆ (β, γ) is positive
(negative), which then implies that centralization (decentralization) performs
better. In addition, because ∆ (β, γ) is decreasing in γ, the threshold value of
the spillover parameter is increasing in γ. This corresponds to part (ii) of the
above Proposition
It follows that centralization can perform better only if the political effec-
tiveness of rent-seeking activities of both groups is sufficiently small. In this
situation, there is a critical value of the spillover parameter, that is increasing
in γ, such that centralization produces a higher level of surplus if and only if β
exceeds this critical level. If, however, the marginal benefit of rent-seeking activ-
ities of both groups is sufficiently large, decentralization yields a higher level of
surplus than does centralization irrespective of the spillover parameter. Indeed,
an increase in the elasticity of the influence function exacerbates distributive
conflicts to the extent that it increases the level of rent-seeking expenditures
and decreases regional welfare without affecting the overall disposition of the
policy of the central government.
I conclude this Section with an example. Let H (g) = g
1−θ
1−θ with 0 < θ < 1
being the elasticity of the marginal valuation for public good. With this specific
function, we have Hg (g) =
³
1
g
´θ
and V (g) =
³
1
g
´ 1
θ
(recall that Hg [V (g)] = g
by definition of the V function). We also consider the following influence func-
tion φ (Tj) = (1/γ)T
γ
j . Then g
0 = (1− β)
1
θ , eg = 1 and eT = γ2θ . Then, the
regional surplus under decentralization is S0 = (1− β)
1−θ
θ
h
θ+β(1−θ)
1−θ
i
and the
regional surplus under centralization is eS = 2θ2−γ(1−θ)2θ(1−θ) . Note that in this case,
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eS ≥ 0 only if γ ≤ 2θ2(1−θ) . We can now calculate for selected values of θ the
threshold value γ such that if γ < γ, there exists a trade-off between centraliza-
tion and decentralization depending on the size of the spillover parameter. The
results are presented in the following Table.13
INSERT TABLE 1
This Table suggests that the threshold value γ of the elasticity of the influ-
ence function must be quite small to obtain a trade-off between the two regimes.
It also suggests that this trade-off is more likely to be obtained for higher values
of the elasticity of the marginal valuation for public good consumption.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we revisit the classic trade-off between centralized and decentral-
ized provision of local public goods. We show that, in the presence of cross-
boundary externalities stemming from locally provided public goods, central-
ization may not be desirable due to the conflict for political influence it may
generate. Indeed, centralized provision of local public goods implies cost sharing
and then creates a conflict of interest between citizens in different regions. This
distributive conflict exists even though all regions have the same preferences for
public spending and is reflected in rent-seeking and influence activities. The cost
of the rent-seeking conflict must then be balanced with the benefits of internal-
izing spillovers to determine which regime performs better. When the influence
function is sufficiently elastic, it is shown that decentralization always dominates
centralization. This is because the prisoner’s dilemma of rent-seeking, under a
centralized system, is too costly relative to the costs of the free-riding incentives
under a decentralized system. If, however, the marginal influence of rent-seeking
activities is sufficiently small, the performance of centralization relative to de-
centralization depends upon the size of the spillover effect. In this situation, we
13To calculate the value γ, we have taken β = 0.49.
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obtain a standard conclusion but from different reasons than emphasized in the
literature.
Throughout, we have assumed that, under centralization the costs of provid-
ing public goods are shared equally among regions. This is justified on empirical
grounds since most centralized systems of government operate (roughly) accord-
ing to such rules.14 This is the case, as in France for example, even though the
central government does not redistribute equally tax revenues among jurisdic-
tions or groups through the provision of differentiated levels of public spending
to account for the heterogeneity in the economy. But, in this paper, the two
localities have identical preferences and value public good consumption to the
same extent. Hence, our assumption of equal cost sharing can also reflect the
outcome of a constitutional stage in which the two regions must agree on the
budgeting process. In turn, sharing the costs of local public spending creates
a budgetary externality and a distributive conflict that does not exist under
decentralization, when each region must pay for its own public good. The de-
centralized structure, however, has also a drawback since interregional spillovers
are not internalized. This involves lower levels of public good provision than
the optimal levels obtained under centralization. In other words, decentraliza-
tion is represented as a market failure whereas centralization is represented as
a political failure. Consequently, a potential trade-off emerges between the two
systems even though regions are perfectly identical.
It would be both interesting and natural to consider some source of asym-
metry across regions. For example, one could consider that the two regions
have different valuations of public good consumption relative to private con-
sumption. If centralization implies policy uniformity, as it is usually assumed
in the literature, demand heterogeneity would reinforce the case for decentral-
ization of public good provision. If, however, the central authority can differ-
14Very often, equal cost sharing is a constitutionally imposed arrangement. For example
in the US, the tax code describing the rules of federal tax collection cannot discriminate
across States. In most European countries, uniform tax rules is also at the core of budgeting
institutions (see, e.g., Von Hagen [26])
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entiate the levels of public spending according to the heterogeneous tastes in
each region, this would eliminate the bias towards decentralization implied by
the heterogeneity in preferences. We then conjecture that, in this case, the
main result of this article would still prevail even though the equilibrium lev-
els of public spending would depend on relative public-goods valuations. It
would also be interesting to consider that there is heterogeneity not only be-
tween, but also within local jurisdictions. In that situation, we could have
rent-seeking and influence activities both at the local and central levels and
the question would be: which regime produces more lobbying.15 Actually,
very few theoretical papers deal with this question. Notable exceptions are
the papers by Bardhan and Mookherjee [4] or Redoano [19]. Using a common
agency framework with heterogeneous individuals, they emphasize that the re-
lationship between the level of centralization of policy decision and lobbying
is ambiguous and depends on the characteristics of the groups that engage in
influence activities. Hence, relaxing the assumption of identical individuals, in
our reduced-form framework but with interregional spillover effects, may yield
interesting results as to the impact of heterogeneity in preferences on lobby-
ing and on the welfare comparison between centralization and decentralization.
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Table 1
0.9
0,35
0.8
0,33
0.7
0,30
0.6
0,28
0.5
0,24
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